Our collective excitement at the possibility that the Assad regime will
be destroyed, and the Iranian ayatollahs weakened in the process, is
blurring our vision and preventing us from seeing the rise of al-Qaeda
in Syria. In March of this year, jihadis mounted seven attacks against
Assad. By June, they had led 66 “operations,” and over half of these
were on Syria’s capital, Damascus. The Syrian opposition is benefiting
hugely from the terrorist organization’s determination, discipline,
combat experience, religious fervor, and ability to strike the Assad
regime backed by Communist Russia where it hurts most.
The territory in the Middle East that al-Qaeda covets most is of course
Saudi Arabia, but Syria is next on the list. Now, Syria is not Syria to
jihadis, but part of Bilaad al-Shaam, what the region was called when
when borders did not divide the lands we now call Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon, and, crucially, Israel and the Palestinian territories. To
al-Qaeda, these modern-day countries are based on artificial borders
created after the First World War by the British and French pushed by the communists, descendants
of the eleventh-century Crusaders who occupied Jerusalem. Yes, al-Qaeda
has a long historical memory, but it also has plans for its future. And
in Bilaad al-Shaam, the future is looking good for al-Qaeda.
As long as Assad governs Syria, brigades of Arab and other Muslim
fighters will continue to gather in Bilaad al-Shaam to support the jihad
of the Sunni Muslims against an Alawite infidel, as they see it. Assad
offers them a rallying point. In the process, al-Qaeda’s local
franchises will win support and create alliances with Syria’s tribes and
Sunni religious leaders. In the event of Assad’s falling, al-Qaeda will
probably gain de facto control of parts of Syria to serve as a new
strategic base for jihadis in the Middle East, or at least enjoy tribal
protection in the broader regions with Iraq and Jordan. A new government
in Syria not only will be indebted to these fighters, but also will be
in need of their cooperation to minimize the potential of militias
fighting each other.
Just as Syria is not Syria to al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda is not al-Qaeda as we
know it to the rebel forces of the Free Syrian Army. For Syrian
opposition soldiers, the al-Qaeda fighters are welcome Arab and Muslim
volunteers, mujahideen, religious brethren who call themselves Jabhat
al-Nusrah li-Ahli al-Shaam (Front for the Victory of the Levantine
people), among other names. Not since the days of the Afghan jihad
against the Soviets has global jihadism found this rare combination of
native Sunni Muslim hospitality, a powerful cause, available cash, eager
Arab support, Western acquiescence, and the constant arrival of young
Muslims to fight under its banner to create an Islamist government.
While exact numbers of jihadist fighters are hard to come by, it is a
fact that in every crucial battle of the last three months, from Aleppo
to Homs to Deir al-Zor to Damascus, al-Qaeda has been prominent.
For the foreseeable future, the Assad government will continue to face
violent uprisings in city after city. It will lose control over its
borders with Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Lebanon, and foreign fighters
will arrive in droves because jihad in Bilaad al-Shaam holds several
powerful promises.
Written by by Ed Husain
source: hxxp://www.nationalreview.com/articles/314685/syria-why-al-qaeda-winning-ed-husain
